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Abstract—Traditional centralised data storage and processing
solutions manifest limitations with regards to overall operational
cost and the security and auditability of data. One of the biggest
issues with existing solutions is the difficulty of keeping track
of who has had access to the data and how the data may have
changed over its lifetime; while providing a secure and easy-
to-use mechanism to share the data between different users.
The ability to electronically regulate data sharing within and
across different organisational entities in the supply-chain (SC),
is an open issue, that is only addressed partially by existing
legal and regulatory compliance frameworks. In this work, we
present Cydon, a decentralised data management platform that
executes bespoke distributed applications utilising a novel search
and retrieve algorithm leveraging metadata attributes. Cydon
utilises a smart distributed ledger to offer an immutable audit
trail and transaction history for all different levels of data access
and modification within a SC and for all data flows within the
environment. Results suggest that Cydon provides authorised and
fast access to secure distributed data, avoids single points of
failure by securely distributing encrypted data across different
nodes while maintains an "always-on" chain of custody.
Index Terms—Supply-chain, Blockchain, smart contracts, Hy-
perledger, Docker.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE the advent in data collection, generation and storagesystems such as the Internet of Things (IoT) and Cloud
computing technologies lead to the creation of massive vol-
umes of personal and sensitive data. The value of such data has
lead to the proliferation of threats with their implications to
domains beyond the electronic space. This phainomenon has
not only raised the necessity to secure interactions between all
the components within the supply-chain (SC); but equally to
develop reliable and cost-effective systems that offer adequate
levels of security and authenticity for data to combat fraud
and integrity violations [1].
The inability to adaquately control data flows within the SC
can impose significant security risks that can manifest adverse
impact on data restoration processes and critical business
operations [2]. The global SC currently faces a significant
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issue to distinguish counterfeit parts from legitimate ones as
the technology used by organised criminal groups (OCGs) has
improved significantly [3]. In addition, several challenges exist
to regulate electronically data sharing processes between third
party suppliers and external entities while maintaining clear
audit trail of data related activities [4]. One partial solution to
this problem, is often to deploy third party auditors (TPAs)
to verify data integrity and reliability between all entities
sharing data within the SC [5]. However, conventional and
often scheduled SC audits are often unable detect anomalies
and handle deficiencies related to data misuse leading to
issues such as erroneous demand forecasting and incomplete
operations planning [6].
The geographical dispersion of SC facilities can also in-
fluence the decisions related to which data related activities
should be performed in each facility [7]. The decision is often
based on the efficiency of centralising versus decentralising
these activities as a function of the proximity to customers and
suppliers. Decision-making based on proximity has usually
strong impact on the cost and performance of the SC where
data management services play a key role in defining the trust
requirements on third-party auditors. The extent to which the
data is accurate, timely and complete can influence decision-
making regarding other parts of the SC such as coordinating
daily activities and forecasting and planning to anticipate fu-
ture demands. The decision on how much information to share
with other companies and how the integrity and authenticity of
that data is assured online as a business enabler is a balancing
act between openness and responsiveness linked to profitability
to fragmented and fast moving markets [8].
Elements such as outsourcing, partnering, and in-house
expertise, are considered key performance metrics of the
core SC operation within which data sharing processes are
often manifested to better understand the requirements of the
customers and define and develop SC capabilities further. Data
is a strategic business resource that dictates the deployment of
suitable sharing models that can offer traceability, integrity and
security aspects throughout data’s whole life-cycle. The use of
Blockchain (BC) technology as a distributed platform for data
management purposes has slowly emerged in the literature as
a way to not only support transaction execution in several SC
processes, but equally to verify the correctness and traceability
of data [9], [10], [11].
At high level, BC is a distributed ledger that its accuracy,
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Fig. 1: Cydon Platform
validity and consistency can be verified by the use of dedicated
consensus mechanisms in a distributed fashion [12]. Strong
cryptographic primitives are usually deployed to assure the
immutability of the ledger with a variety of implementations,
trust models and threat models as appropriate [13]. In these en-
vironments data integrity and immutability can be considered
as key security components irrespective of the IT infrastructure
used such as Cloud service delivery models, storage server
technologies and architectures [14]. These technologies act as
trusted third parties to verify the reliability and accurateness of
the data transmitted, stored and processed and seek to rather
centralise data processing which makes them susceptible to a
number of issues around data availability, integrity and high
operational costs [15].
The impact of security breaches in SC dictates a clear
incident management approach where detection, prevention,
response and mitigation doctrines are at its core [16]. The
threat landscape in SC is not only constantly evolving but
also presents unique risks associated to disruption of ser-
vices while the co-ordination of organised cyber crime rings
makes them harder to detect. There are several standards and
procedures introduced in the public domain with regards to
SC management but the efficacy of these practices remain
largely incomplete due to the heterogeneity of responses
and the different ways that risk is assessed both internally
and externally to these environments [17]. Elements such as
dependencies between exporters and importers, logistics, ship-
JOURNAL OF TRANSACTION ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, VOL. XX, NO. X, JUNE 2019 3
ping management, insurance and government bodies create a
complex and unique SC ecosystem in terms of the security
requirements that poses significant challenges in maintaining
the chain of custody [18]. The adaptation of BC technologies
can influence metrics in Supply-chain Management (SCM),
such as transportation cost modelling and optimise existing
warehouse efficiency models. These technologies are promised
to decompose sources of information and suppliers’ rela-
tionships better. The different ways that Distributed ledger
technologies (DLT) can be deployed can create value for the
supply chain manager with regards to all scheduling activities
related to manufacturing, testing, packaging and preparation
for delivery [19]. This can hence improve levels of production
output and overall productivity from all differences within the
SC while optimising specific processes within the logistics
and information management systems [20]. Authors in [21]
emphasise on perceptual economic models based on BC as
a means to better articulate specific layers of value creation
recording and actualisation. The exponential increase in dis-
tributed applications has revolutionised the SC optimisation
tools by optimally allocating capital resources and business
growth processes and data management [22], [23].
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
II discusses related works in the field of distributed ledger
technology with focus on its application to data processing and
management. Section III presents the design, implementation
and testing of our Cydon data management platform and
its novel metadata search and retrieve algorithm. The pro-
posed solution consists of an underlying Private Permissioned
Blockchain and a distributed storage technology coupled with
a novel algorithm for anchor generation used for a secure
and “off-chain" data search and retrieval. The execution of
our algorithm is done by the development and deployment
of bespoke smart contracts directly injected in the Blockchain
network. In Section IV, we present a preliminary threat model
against our solution with emphasis placed upon our dedicated
smart contracts. Initial results of Cydon’s performance and
testbed parameters are discussed in Section V. Finally, Section
VI concludes our work.
II. RELATED WORKS
DLTs are gaining momentum in the last few years as core
technologies that they can offer significant improvements to
existing data-processing capabilities [24]. The new immutabil-
ity and transparency aspects that BC technologies can offer are
promised to minimise human error increase the overall trust to
all business processes and optimise specific data governance
processes [25]. Typically, a BC network consists of many
nodes that maintain a set of shared states that are frequently
changed by associated transactions. The transactional mod-
elling the BC utilises does not differ significantly from the
traditional database model other than the assumption that the
nodes in a BC network may exhibit Byzantine behaviour [26].
BC transactions are encapsulated into blocks forming an
immutable and indisputable chain using a Merkle tree structure
(See Fig. 2). Many cryptographic schemes deploy Merkle trees
that establish specific relationships between a tree leaf value
Fig. 2: Blocks of transactions using Merkle trees
and the root node value so as the authenticity of the latter
can be established. Sibling leaves are combined and hashed
to form a parent leaf repetitively. The traversal mechanism
developed allows the values from all leaves to be stored outside
the memory space [27]. Depending on the way that these
transactions are verified, a distinction between private and
public BC deployments is made. The necessity to centrally
verify transactions is removed with invalid transactions not be
admitted in the BC network while maintaining some degree
of anonymity and auditability in the process [28].
Common assumptions made in private and public BC de-
ployments are: 1) the necessity to store a state and that 2)
multiple participants are willing to commit transactions. In
cases that not all participants are known, a permissionless BC
model often applies; whereas if all participants are known but
not trusted and public verifiability of transactions is required
then a public permissioned BC model is more appropriate.
In cases that public verifiability of transactions is not required
between untrusted participants then a private permissioned BC
is often deployed [29]. In private BC deployments, business
logic can be expressed by the development of smart contracts.
These smart contracts are often described as distributed ap-
plications built on top of the ledger and used to capture key
data abstractions that represent key business processes in the
form of verifiable transactions agreed by all parties through
a consensus [30]. There is evidence to suggest that this is a
desirable property useful to sectors such as finance and data
management [31],[32],[33],[34].
In terms of using BC technologies for data distribution and
processing processes, work in [35] introduced the concept of
searching mechanisms over encrypted keywords. The authors
have defined a ZKP authentication module for the access
to a private permissioned BC with and off-chain storage
capability. Although the model promises to introduce certain
benefits in terms of performance, no real implementation of the
platform is given. Authors in [26], introduced a dedicated BC
benchmarking solution to evaluate the performance of existing
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technologies against specific data processing and transactional
processes. They argue that BC is still immature as a technology
to replace traditional database systems, due to the fact that
consensus protocols must be optimised further in terms of
their increased verification times and admission processing
overheads. They do, however, record the improvements made
from decoupling the data storage from the actual execution
engine by outsourcing the consensus process in existing data
models. The optimisation issues of consensus mechanisms
have been recently addressed in [36],[37].
The issue of tracing data in a transparent way has been
discussed in [38]. The authors have developed a data sharing
scheme that seperates data from transactions and enables a
logical double chain structure to assure data traceability. This
is done by dividing data into blocks that form the basis for
the sharing and tracing capabilities developed as part of their
scheme using the Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)
consensus protocol. A distinction is made between data that
is frequently accessed but infrequently modified in [39]. The
authors introduced a framework that combines Ethereum and
Hadoop distributed filesystem (HDFS) for public BC deploy-
ments. Data retention of large amount of data for longer
periods is of paramount importance and a driving factors
behind this work. The framework assures certain degree of
history tracking in off-chain storage systems in a decentralised
fashion using persistent storage of forensically relevant evi-
dence (metadata). Their results suggest a quicker response time
of reading and validating a file almost inversely proportional
to its size. This research area was also explored in [40] where
homomorphic verifiable tags were used to assure provable
data possession (PDP) using dynamic data while virtualised
machines executed the smart contracts on the BC. The in-
tegrity features on this work were identified as well-formed
transactions, separation of duty, authentication, audit, principle
of least privilege, objective control and control over privilege
transfer, following the Clark-Wilson model. The issue of data
retention and secure log distribution and sharing was also
investigated for deployments in existing Cloud and associated
service delivery models (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS) [41] . The authors
have emphasised on the preservation time of logs and its
importance to threat identification arguing on the scalability of
centralised solutions when dealing with large scale data logs.
A private BC has been proposed as a storage log management
system across different organisational entities and devices
using a novel checkpoint logs that guarantee the integrity of
all logs based on their number and fixed timeframes. In terms
of Cloud deployments, works in [42], [43] uses the Cloud
as the main storage facility where the BC network is used
as a controllable trustworthy data management solution where
voting and vetting on data validity is controlled by a trust
authority. The BC network becomes the voting station that
authorises (or not) further changes to data by distinguishing
between voting and counting distributed applications executed
on the BC.
SC collaboration is an acknowledged and significant chal-
lenge within the Pharmaceutical industry [44]. Sharing of
information and controlling intellectual property are a concern
across two specific activities: 1) the co-development of new
substances/products (drugs) and 2) planning activity external
to the organisation. A typical drug development programme
estimates to have all its medical records electronically stored
and processed [45]. There is a wide range of skills required
to translate research into commercially available drugs. As
a consequence, collaborative arrangements between organi-
sations are common as a means of exploiting organisational
competencies and reducing financial risk. It is therefore clear
that within the Pharmaceutical SC, BC technology can offer
the verification of the intellectual contribution made by collab-
orative parties and the secure sharing of sensitive intellectual
property and regulated data with clinics, regulators, physicians
and partners such as charities and Contract Research Organi-
sations [46].
The key assets created during a pharmaceutical development
programme are: 1) the formulation (GMP standard), 2) the
data package and 3) the associated intellectual property rights.
Where more than one organisations contribute towards the
creation of these assets, it is important to keep a record of
respective contributions rendering BC technology a suitable
candidate to this domain. The sharing of patient-level data,
following clinical trials, is viewed as being important to
ongoing scientific research that has the potential to deliver
benefits to future patients and society [47]. There are certain
requirements to maintain privacy of clinical trial participants
which has led to the following outcomes: 1) the data holder
must anonymise or de-identify the data, before sharing it with
researchers [48]. This creates problems in so much that the
data becomes less useful for answering scientific questions
and it increases the chance that misleading interpretations of
the data might occur. 2) Over-reliance on legally binding data
sharing agreements (between data holder and researcher) that
define the usage limitations on the data. 3) A call for controlled
access of trial data via a secure locked box system.
Distributed Cloud storage architectures based on BC have
been introduced in the literature to address e2e security issues.
[49]. In their work, the authors distinguish between users who
need cloud storage service and users that can supply empty
storage as part of their unstructured P2P environment. An
optimisation scheme is developed to solve the file block replica
placement issue between all entities that hold multiple copies
of the data. Results suggest no loss of data across the whole
infrastructure while reducing the overall transmission delay in
comparison to alternative data centre architecture(s).
A publicly verifiable data deletion protocol has been intro-
duced in [50]. The authors use a dedicated timestamp server as
a the trusted authority to provide the necessary information to
the cloud server for the production of the data deletion proof.
The existing threat model assumes a “semi-honest" server as
part of their analysis but more is needed with regards to the
possible clock de-synchronisation attacks against the protocol.
The concept of secure and private data sharing using DLTs
has been explored in [51]. The main research focus is to
provide privacy while maintaining fine-grained access control
over the data shared. Recent legal and regulatory requirements
for entities possessing and sharing data dictate appropriate
data verification mechanisms in place such as data custodians,
rendering the process as time-consuming and often inefficient.
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The complete lack of sharing facilities for data custodians has
propelled research in personal data storage (PDS) solutions,
especially in cases that different types of data need to be
aggregated and appropriate control to be attributed to the data
owners [52],[53].
III. CYDON DATA MANAGEMENT PLATFORM
Cydon is a reliable and functional data management plat-
form that runs over a dedicated cluster of smart contracts
through a web-portal. This platform creates transactions based
on relevant logs produced using a search and retrieve algorithm
executed on the target network by invoking multiple smart
contracts (See Sec. III-C). These logs are cryptographically
hashed and encapsulated into blocks and pushed into a private
permissioned BC for verification purposes using Hyperledger
Fabric. This is achieved with the development of relevant
distributed application(s) (smart contracts) running by our
platform. The actual data is distributed and stored securely
across multiple locations using an off-chain storage capability
to ensure data availability and redundancy inside the network.
Authorised users access the system, logs and data via a
dedicated web portal.
The overall structure of our Cydon platform is illustrated
in Fig. 1. The platform utilises a metadata attribute extraction
engine where forensically relevant information is extracted for
any given data. There are seven attributes extracted and used
as an input to generate a unique fingerprint for each data.
That fingerprint is then used as a keyword (anchor) that is
stored on the blockchain network via a transaction executed
through a dedicated smart contract. All anchors are stored
in an encrypted fashion using a set of strong iterative block
ciphers via the users’ GUI. To upload a new file, the user
authenticates himself in the frontend and sends a file to a
specific endpoint using a convenient web form. The file is
first encoded using 256bit AES whose initialisation random
vector is inserted at the beginning of the file. The resulting
stream is then forwarded to IPFS to be stored and to retrieve
the corresponding hash. The latter is the first component of a
data structure that also includes any keywords provided by the
user and all metadata extracted from the file. Among them,
we mention the original name of the file, its creation and
modification date, the size and the owner. The metadata is
serialised as a single buffer of bytes which is encoded using the
private key of the Cydon token; hence, it is accessed as a single
and indivisible entity. On the other hand, the keywords are
individually encoded and saved in an array allowing the smart
contract to examine the relevance of the results without decod-
ing them. Finally, the entire structure is serialised and stored as
the blockchain transaction payload. The key associated with
the latter coincides with the public id of the Cydon Token,
which will become an index in the state-database underlying
each peer, making search queries almost instantaneous. The
requester can traverse the BC and execute searches for key-
words (anchors) that correspond to the location of encrypted
data. The requester executes dedicated search smart contracts
associated with both the request and retrieval processes. These
processes are encapsulated and mapped against a specific data
object for auditing and validation purposes, namely our Cydon
token explained in Sec. III-B. All attempts to upload, search
and retrieve or manipulate data are recorded for each user
and associated tokens. There is an audit distributed application
that automatically creates a report of actions and transactions
carried out for all tokens in the platform for auditing and
compliance purposes. The encryption and decryption processes
are executed on-the-fly by probing the location of encrypted
data within an IPFS distributed storage network across all
nodes within the Private permissioned BC environment. IPFS
is a combination of a P2P network and a protocol for data
storing in a distributed manner using content-addressing to
identify each file in a global namespace. Files are distributed
using a BitTorrent-based protocol creating links between nodes
that store the content using cryptographic hashes. It utilises the
Merkle Directed Acyclic Graphs data structure as part of its
core operation. This enables IPFS to offer content addressing,
de-duplication and tamper-proof capabilities in terms of the
way that data is stored and indexed in our Cydon platform
[54].
A. Design and Requirements
Sharing sensitive information with third parties who are not
part of a formal collaboration does occur within several SC.
For instance, charities are a significant source of research
funding, along with Government departments, and there is
an expectation that representatives of these organisations will
be kept informed of progress. Giving updates to third par-
ties provides ample opportunity for knowledge / information
leakage. While inadvertent disclosure of data is a problem,
the high commercial value of the data being exchanged also
makes it a target for organises cyber-crime rings. For example,
drug development companies that rely upon Contract Research
Organisations (CRO) to perform elements of their research
programme required to share sensitive information so that
the planned research can be specified correctly. Whenever
there is sharing of sensitive information there is a need
for suitable technology that minimises the capacity of other
parties to disclose it. Our Cydon platform provides a secure
information sharing environment and allows the identification
of any individual who accesses data to be established. The
nature of our BC also ensures that any unauthorised changes to
data can be pinpointed and attributed to a given token after the
authorisation process is completed. The assumption here is that
all data flows are passing through our Cydon platform. Specific
APIs have been developed to provide interoperability between
Cydon and de-facto authentication schemes currently used
(E.g. Kerberos, Active directory, SSO, etc). In an attempt to
identify the key metrics to be developed as part of our platform
the following design requirements have been identified in
Table II.
B. Cydon Cryptographic token
The smart contract operation executes both upload and
searching capabilities with completely different APIs devel-
oped. The Cydon Token, Ct (See Table III) is a compound
object stored in the local database and uniquely identified by
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TABLE I: Cydon design requirements
Design Requirements: Usage
Authentication module Appropriate authorisation levels to data uploader / requester
Anchor generation engine Metadata extraction attributes to be used as the seeds
Anchor linking to the BC The transaction for the uploader and keyword storage, and the retrieval capability with fast execution
Identification of data location Universal hash matching as part of the searching process and integrity verification
Distributed storage location A customised distributed FS solution to be linked to the smart contract operations
Encrypted storage and keygen Confidentiality aspects as part of the transaction that control uploads and decryption processes from the requester
TABLE II: Metadata Feature Extraction Attributes
Features: Description
Ctime Creation Time: The time the file created
Mtime Modified Time: This timestamp describes when was the last time the file was modified
MFT Master File Table: describes information about a file, including its size, time and date stamps, permissions, and data content
Atime Accessed Time: A timestamp to describe when was the last time the file was accessed
MCT Metadata Change Time: Time the MFT Record was last modified
DCCT Data Content Change Time: Time Data content of a file was last modified
its primary key (field Id), autogenerated after the insertion.
The creation of such a token takes place during the upload of
new content: the user is able to provide a human readable alias
(field Alias) and the system automatically generates all other
fields, more specifically the symmetric encryption key (field
DataKey) used to encode the payload, the salt (field Keyword-
Key) used to hash possibly provided keywords and the token’s
public id. The newly generated token is then associated with
a single user through the foreign key UserId, identifying him
as the owner. Moreover, it is also linked to many possible re-
cipients through the many-to-many relationship “Permission”
which ensures that only allowed users are able to retrieve the
original content. The public id is the only part of the token
which is stored in the BC’s transactions and it can be used to
search for the corresponding material. Furthermore, the public
id (and the Cydon token itself) may be re-used in several
uploads, acting as a grouping mechanism to keep different
contents together even if submitted in different time instants.
In this case we can provide access to specific data associated
with muptiple uploads based on the authorisation levels.
C. Smart Contracts design and Execution
The Cydon system currently includes four smart contracts
which are injected in the BC network namely Upload, Query,
download and Audit. The Upload Smart Contract, is invoked at
the end of the upload process to generate the final transaction.
Assuming the user needs to upload new content, the first step
is to access the front-end through authentication. In this case,
the new content requires a new Cydon token which can be
generated by calling a server-side service through the exposed
APIs. Access to the platform is protected by form-based
authentication, where users log in using their usernames and
passwords. These credentials are sent to an API endpoint that
generates a JSON Web Token (JWT) containing the unique
identifier of the user, his access level (either admin or regular
user) with the validity of one day. The payload is signed via
a secret key available only to the server, in order to block any
possible infringement. Except for the authentication function,
all other APIs require the passage of this token in the call
header. In this way, identity management is delegated to the
client without requiring the presence of a server-side session,
which would limit the scalability of the platform.
Recipients selected and their authorisation level will be
stored as token’s permissions in the server database. Even if
the newly generated token contains the encryption keys for
both payload and keywords, only its public id is revealed to the
client as it is the only part that needs to be shared. At this point,
the user can select files for upload and eventually inserts the
associated keywords. Files’ payloads are sent to the backend
where they are encrypted using the chosen token’s symmetric
key and then stored in the distributed file system which, in
turns, returns the file id that uniquely identifies the resource.
The public id, the file id and keywords are the fundamental
elements for creating an upload-transaction in the BC. The
request arrives at the backend again through an exposed API
and it is forwarded to the Hyperledger infrastructure where it
is then executed. The, transaction’s parameters are checked,
and the structure is validated against a default schema. If all
checks pass, the transaction is created and the world-state db is
accordingly updated, completing the upload process. This will
allow the allocation of groups of entities to a single token for
both the retrieval and modification processes associated with
files.
When the user wants to retrieve the file-list associated with
a token, he provides to the frontend the public token-id and
eventually any keywords needed to restrict the results. Since
in this phase the user is already authenticated, the frontend
is able to lookup the database-id that uniquely identifies him
and verifies that he has at least read access. This check is
performed by traversing a one-to-many table linked to the main
tokens-table, which contains all the authorised users together
with their access level. Even if the user created that token
in the first place, his access must be explicitly allowed in
the permission table. In this way, the system can preclude
writing, and even reading content previously uploaded after
being revoked (for example, after a change of duty). The
query attempt, its outcome (either allowed or forbidden) and
the eventual results are stored in the blockchain for auditing
purpose. The download process uses the same token-validation
method: besides the desired token, the user also has to provide
the hash of the inquired file. Assuming read access is granted
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TABLE III: Cydon-token Ct fields and corresponding contexts of use (UP=upload, QU=query, AU=audit, DN=download)
Field Type Usage Notes
PublicId CP guid UP, QU, DN, AU Shareable public uniq. id
DataKey CD byte[32] UP, DN Symmetric key (payload)
KeywordKey CK byte[64] UP, QU HMAC key (keywords)
to the requester, the data is retrieved from IPFS and its integrity
is verified by recomputing its hash-value. The file is finally
sent to the user and a detailed download transaction is added
to the blockchain.
D. Upload smart contract
The user U starts the upload process by providing a public
id CP , a file F and an array of keywords K as follows:
1: if not HasWriteAccess(U,CP ) then
2: return . exit if user has no right to add files to this
token
3: end if
4: C ← Lookup(CP ) . get token from database
5: IV ← RandomBytes(16) . 128 bits initialisation vector
6: E ← AESe(CD, IV ) . generate AES 256 bits encoder
7: FE ← Concat(IV , E(F )) . encode the file
8: H ← StoreAndGetHash(FE) . store encrypted file
and get hash
9: M ← {Fname, U} . store filename and user in metadata
10: IV ← RandomBytes(16) . refresh initialisation vector
11: E ← AESe(CD, IV ) . refresh encoder
12: ME ← Concat(IV , E(Serialise(M))) . serialise and
encode metadata
13: KE ← ∅ . prepare encrypted keywords array
14: for all k ∈ K do . for all keywords
15: KE ← KE ∪HmacSha256(k,CK) . encrypt and
append
16: end for
17: StoreUploadTransaction(CP , H,ME ,KE)
18: return
E. Query smart contract
The second smart contract needed is the search functionality.
In this scenario, the users need only the public id of the
content they want to retrieve. However, they can also provide
a list of keywords to refine the search further. This will enable
selective access to files from a list of files associated with a
token and authorised to access. Before reaching the BC, the
query is first evaluated in the backend to check if the user
has access to the Cydon token pointed by the public id. The
query smart contract is then executed: after the mandatory
check of parameters, the chain-code integrates over all upload
transactions looking up for the given public id. All valid
entries are returned to the backend with associated scores and
calculated as the number of matching keywords in assisting
the user to locate relevant material. Finally, the user can
download a specific content, automatically retrieve it with
the help of the corresponding file-id and then decrypted by
the previously acquired Cydon token. The user U starts the
query process by providing a public id CP and an array of
keywords K. The whole execution steps are given as follows:
1: allowed← HasReadAccess(U,CP ) . check if user
has read access
2: C ← Lookup(CP ) . get token from database
3: KE ← ∅ . prepare encrypted keywords array
4: for all k ∈ K do . for all keywords
5: KE ← KE ∪HmacSha256(k,CK) . encrypt and
append
6: end for
7: res← ∅ . prepare query result
8: if allowed then
9: TU ← {tx ∈ Blockchain : type(tx) = upload ∧
tx.CP = CP }
10: for all tu ∈ TU do . for all matching uploads
transactions
11: tu.Score← |tu.KE ∩KE | . compute score
12: end for
13: res← TU
14: end if
15: M ← {K,Uid, allowed, res} . store search in metadata
16: IV ← RandomBytes(16) . 128 bits initialisation vector
17: E ← AESe(CD, IV ) . generate AES 256 bits encoder
18: ME ← Concat(IV , E(Serialise(M))) . serialise and
encode metadata
19: StoreQueryTransaction(CP ,ME)
20: return res
F. Download smart contract
The user U starts the download process by providing a
public id CP and the hash H of the file he wants to download
as follows:
1: allowed← HasReadAccess(U,CP ) . check if user
has read access
2: C ← Lookup(CP ) . get token from database
3: M ← {H,Uid, allowed} . store download in metadata
4: IV ← RandomBytes(16) . 128 bits initialisation vector
5: E ← AESe(CD, IV ) . generate AES 256 bits encoder
6: ME ← Concat(IV , E(Serialise(M))) . serialise and
encode metadata
7: StoreDownloadTransaction(CP ,ME)
8: if allowed then
9: FE ← GetF ileFromHash(H) . get encrypted file
from storage
10: IV ← FE [1 : 16] . get initialisation vector from the
file head
11: D ← AESd(CD, IV ) . generate AES 256 bits
decoder
12: F ← D(FE [17 : end]) . decode the file tail
13: return F
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14: else
15: return nil
16: end if
G. Audit smart contract
The audit can be generated by users with administrative
access to the platform by providing the public id CP . This
takes the form of a detailed report generation with a clear
audit trail of all transactions executed and associated with a
specific Cydon token Ct. The execution sequences of our audit
smart contract are given below:
1: C ← Lookup(CP ) . get token from database
2: TU ← {tx ∈ Blockchain : tx.CP = CP }
3: for all tu ∈ TU do . for all matching transactions, of
any type
4: IV ← tu.ME [1 : 16] . get initialisation vector from
metadata head
5: D ← AESd(CD, IV ) . generate AES 256 bits
decoder
6: tu.M ← D(tu.ME [17 : end]) . decode transaction
metadata
7: end for
8: return TU
A core element of Cydon platform is the audit smart-
contract which provides an immutable trace of every user
action, storing both the requests and the results for all ded-
icated BC transactions. In fact, each Cydon smart-contract
contributes to the generation of the audit by appending context-
specific information. For example, the upload and the down-
load smart-contracts write transactions that contain the actual
user and the related anchor/file hash.
During the search action the complete search query is stored
including the keywords, the corresponding results and a flag to
indicate if the user was allowed to execute such search based
on the Cydon-token permissions. This permits the creation of
an invaluable chronological complete report with both valid
and invalid accesses to specific protected content.
IV. THREAT MODEL
Despite the innovative solutions BC promises to bring to
the data decentralisation, storage and processing capability, the
technology itself seems to present some inherent security risks.
The Cydon system must maintain the key security principles
represented by the CIA Triad; confidentiality, integrity and
availability. Furthermore, other attributes include Productiv-
ity and Proprietary. Table IV summarises potential threats
affecting these attributes. We have identified that Spoofing
could occur at the network level (e.g. ARP poisoning/spoofing)
to facilitate a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack against the
system where a session could also be hijacked. It could also
occur at the application level e.g. when an authentication
mechanism is bypassed, and the attacker gain access to the
permissioned BC with a spoofed ID.
The system includes a web interface which introduces
threats by means of Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and SQL
injection. Furthermore, gaining access to the network could
allow tampering to data in transit. This type of data is not
yet hashed into the BC and the system would therefore be
vulnerable to such attack. The BC provides means to maintain
and verify records’ integrity. However, data in transit will go
through encryption tunnels using protocols such as TLS and
signed Certificates to thwart tampering attempts.
Information leakage will occur if access control fails; an
attacker could consider gaining a copy of the SQLite DB
through an injection attack to brute-force the user credentials
of sys-admins. Information can also be leaked at the user
end if their system is compromised (e.g. keylogger software).
Furthermore, any unpatched vulnerability (e.g. zero-day) in
the infrastructure and software installed could allow data ex-
filtration from the network. The system includes a distributed
ledger which is good to resist Denial of Service (DoS) due
to floods of requests. However, other parts such as the Web
Service is central and could be overwhelmed with a DDoS.
Backup, various levels of data redundancy, and fall-back are
all means to adapt to DoS attacks where possible. Since
Cydon provides multiple copies of encrypted data stored in
a distributed fashion, it does offer certain level of protection
in terms of data redundancy.
An implementation vulnerability or misconfiguration (e.g.
weak admin password) could allow an attacker to escalate
privilege in the system. In response, authorisation will be
enforced with access to resources facilitated via access control
systems. Other threats include system misconfiguration and
unpatched products. This can be hardware such as Internet
gateways, or software such as a Web interface vulnerable
to SQL injection attacks. Nonetheless, in permissioned BC
implementations, only pre-selected set of trusted nodes can
create new transactions. Therefore, there is a threat that an
attacker exploits this established trust model by gaining access
to one or more of these nodes and disrupts the system at large.
Attacks such as the devaluation of cryptocurrencies, loss of
mining rewards, or even closure of cryptocurrency exchanges
do not apply in our platform since there is no mining process
taking place or crypto-wallet existent within the network. The
private nature of the implementation renders specific attacks
applicable to open blockchain networks such as selfish mining
more challenging to implement against Cydon. Since all
entities are authenticated to the platform database, security and
associated controls have been implemented to mitigate some of
the security risks. Although a systematic decomposition of our
smart contracts’ data-flow is outside the scope of this work, no
initial patterns were identified to imply violation of the security
principles and properties assumed during their development.
Part of our future work is to audit all smart contracts developed
using the tool introduced in [55]. The authors propose a smart
contract auditing approach were the data-flaw of smart contract
in Ethereum is symbolically encoded. The solution promises
to automatically check the compliance of the smart contract
against security patterns in an attempt to prove or disprove
functional security properties.
To create transactions or to read their contents, the user
must be authenticated in the application frontend, so that
it is possible to extract his blockchain access credentials
subsequently verified by the Certificate Authority (CA) of
the organisation to which he belongs. During the invocation
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of smart contracts, our approach is strengthened by adding
further structural checks. We achieve that by comparing the
transactional payload with a strict JSON scheme published
in [56]. We refuse execution if properties deemed mandatory
are missing or non-compliant. Moreover, the existence of
unnecessary properties is also considered a blocking factor,
both to avoid unwanted data and to limit the growth of the
Blockchain undermining its scalability.
Currently, there is a clear trade-off between the block size
and the ability of the BC network to resist against possible
DDoS attacks. Bigger blocks allow more records to be stored
at the expense of complicating the running and managing
processes in the BC nodes. The distributed data storage
capability creates an increased attack surface that can provide
a skilful adversary with alternative ways to access data stored
at the nodes. Data mining, data correlation and traffic analysis
can be utilised by skilful adversaries to retrieve valuable
information related to smart contracts, users, network structure
and applications running. Issues associated with traditional
Public key cryptography are also manifested with regards to
the private key management, confirmation of the user’s identity
and assumptions about key usage, key freshness and key
generation. In typical scenarios, nodes are solely responsible
for the generation, secure storage and use of their private key
often without the necessary entropy required. That can lead
to vulnerabilities that can expose private key information to
an adversary, tampering the user’s BC account and difficulties
related to tracking criminal behaviour against modified BC
information. The authors have not investigated crypto-viral
extortion software attacks as this is considered outside the
scope of this present work.
Malicious contracts can be executed by skilful adversaries
for malicious activities that can exploit security vulnerabilities
in our four legitimate smart contracts [57], [58]. Significant
risks apply when external contracts are called without control-
ling their flow, allowing changes to the data in an unexpected
way. Irregularities and exception handling, privacy values
leaked by nodes and orderers and altering contracts during or
after deployment are typical attack vectors potentially present
in our network. We accept that risk as low in our Cydon
Platform as both the searching and linking smart contracts
are strictly executed via an authorisation and authentication
module as part of our work. BC support interoperation between
different users, applications, and processes. The way that data
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is stored, processed and updated create a substantial economic
benefit and motivation for adversaries to interfere with the
security management and self-organisation of the platform.
Certain elements related to privacy enhancement as part of
the BC operation might render it impossible to verify and
trace users true identity. We have partially mitigated this threat
by both the creation of the Cydon token and the secure and
decentralised storage of data across multiple filesystems. There
are possibilities of misconfigured transactions, increasing the
complexity of the script that controls our contracts’ injection.
These contract-type transactions must be verified, and the
accuracy of the script that controls them should be tested. That
verification process becomes a necessity, especially in cases
that the BC network grows more complex and transaction
facilitators are scattered. This is something that we have
documented as part of our future work.
V. CYDON TESTBED AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The structure of the test environment is shown in Fig.
3. To better emulate a real-world scenario, the network is
divided into several virtual machines (VMs) administrated by
VirtualBox. Each virtual machine includes many Docker con-
tainers interconnected among them and further connections are
established to other devices through a Docker Swarm network.
The typical network consists of a single VM containing the
application frontend, a VM for the storage and a configurable
number of VMs representing the organisations accessing the
BC. The application frontend is a container built around a
web application written in ASP.NET Core that exposes all
the platform’s functionalities through standard API, easily
accessible from any client.
A web-based client has been developed in WebAssembly /
Blazor which is able to provide high performance as the code
is compiled and natively executed within the browser itself.
The frontend machine also incorporates the BC orderer and
Hyperledger Explorer, a tool which provides a quick analysis
of BC structure through specific APIs and dashboards (See
Fig. 4a).
Admin users can access the administration area to activate,
lock or delete users and groups via the Frontend docker con-
tainer. Users have specific permissions, whenever they upload
new content, search it or both making them the fundamental
recipients associated to each upload (see Fig. 4b).
On the other hand, groups provide an elegant way to
allow data access to an entire business unit or office: adding
(or removing) a user to (from) a group immediately allows
(blocks) him to access all the uploaded content associated with
that group, without the need to manually set the corresponding
permissions. In the main section of the Frontend container
users can upload new content and execute search queries. Files
can be uploaded and associated with one or more significant
keywords that characterise the data being sent and will help
future searches.
Moreover, the user has the possibility to set the allowed
recipients, by choosing from specific users and groups. To
search for a document, the user needs to provide the cydon
token generated during the upload. Furthermore, keywords can
be used to limit the results-set further. A dashboard section
is designed to summarise the usage of the system providing,
among other things, KPIs regarding the number of uploaded
files, the top accessed contents and health of the system itself.
The storage VM contains a configurable number of IPFS
nodes each one accompanied by the corresponding cluster
node necessary to set up the content replica. Inside each organ-
isation’s VM, there is the corresponding Certificate Authority
for managing PKI, a CLI (Command Line Interface) container
to manage the organisation and a configurable number of peer
nodes. Each node is flanked by the corresponding CouchDB
database in which the transaction-generated world-state is
saved. Tests were performed on a server equipped with an i7-
5930K CPU consisting of 12 cores at 3.50GHz and 64Gb of
memory, allowing us to provide two cores and 8gb to each
machine. 15-nodes storage was created together with three
VMs corresponding to three organizations. Each VM contains
a variable number of peers between 2 and 10. Every peer
was able to endorse a transaction and it was injected with the
smart contracts, leading to the creation of an additional Docker
entity, for a grand total of 200 containers.
The performance of the Cydon platform has been evaluated
in all its main functionalities, i.e., the upload of new files, the
search for contents given the corresponding token and their
download. As a first step, an application called Cydon-Cydon
command line interface (CCLI) was developed to allow the
invocation of all exposed APIs from the command line, greatly
facilitating the subsequent testing phases. The CCLI was
developed in Golang and, based on the arguments specified in
the command line, is able to talk all the Cydon platform APIs.
For example, one can retrieve the list of available tokens or
create new ones. Similar functions are available for the storage
part, user management and smart contracts invocation. The
result of each sub-command has been formatted so as to be
immediately reusable as a parameter of a subsequent operation
(eg the creation of the token returns the public Id that can be
used for uploading the file). This composition of commands
generates a chain of actions that facilitates the batch execution
of all Cydon functions, including our tests and benchmarks.
In order to elicit the performance of our smart contracts,
we separate their evaluation from the rest of the processes,
especially, the file encoding/decoding performance in both the
upload and download phases. To achieve this goal, during our
tests, the smart contracts were injected directly into the peers
of the BC, exploiting the fact that each one has an independent
instance of the chain-code. Results were collected in Matlab
by accessing APIs provided by Hyperledger Explorer, in order
to extract timestamps and other useful data for the overall
performance of Cydon.
With regards to the upload phase, Fig. 5b, 5d show the
ability to generate 2550 − 3000 transactions per minute,
corresponding to about 150 blocks. It is interesting to see
how six peers seem to strike an optimal balance between
invocations parallelism and consensus complexity, which must
collect all responses by the endorser peer. Analogously, Fig. 5a
demonstrates how Cydon is capable of performing 500 to 1000
searches per minute, based on the number of requesting peers
and files associated with the token. The loss of performance
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TABLE IV: Potential threats against the Cydon’s key security attributes
Attributes Threats
Inbound/Outbound; Data in Transit Stored; Data in resident
Confidentiality Copy/sniff Access; copy
Integrity Spoof; relay Edit
Availability Overload; Delete; overload
Authenticity Spoof; relay Edit
Productivity Overload Overload
Proprietary Propagate; relay Access; copy
is not proportional to the growth of the number of records,
confirming that it is not necessary to go through the whole
BC to get results, but to only access the underlying database
selectively for that process. Therefore, the search and retrieve
overhead should be attributed to the greater size of the
response, which contains all the files’ anchors. Work in [59]
investigates the overhead for compressed data using Cloud as
the platform.
The tests show that the number of transactions obtainable
with Cydon is at most a few thousand transactions per minute.
Compared to relational databases, this is a result of several
orders of magnitude smaller than is directly related to the use
of a distributed ledger technology and its consensus meth-
ods. Where the centralized database searches for maximum
performance, the primary purpose of the blockchain is to
save data in an unmodifiable and unassailable way. As far as
queries are concerned, performances are generally less spaced
since the most common blockchain implementations, including
Hyperlegder Fabric, maintain the current status in a NoSQL
database avoiding the need to cross all the blocks. The limited
scalability is another disadvantage of the blockchain compared
to traditional approaches: in Cydon the inevitable growth is
minimized by saving the files in an off-chain storage but the
possibility of using side-chains is being evaluated.
The encoding and decoding part of the files has been evalu-
ated separately, using scripts capable of repeatedly sending
data of different sizes. The impact of symmetric encoding
is evident in Fig. 6 in the case of reduced file-size. The
Enc time and Plain time series correspond to the average
time required (expressed in milliseconds) to add a new file
to the storage, encrypted and unencrypted respectively. For
each evaluated file size, these times result in an average
platform throughput, expressed on the secondary y-axis as
files per minute. The impact of data encryption has been
estimated as the percentage increase of the time required by
the encoded upload compared to the unencrypted one.The
encoding process exhibits up to a 50% performance drop
compared to the same plaintext content. With the growth in
file size, the weight of the encoding decreases by up to 9%
for 20MB files. The frontend was developed using the Asp.Net
Core 2.0 framework, inheriting its characteristics of speed and
modularity. The choice was made considering the expertise
of the development team and the fact that the platform is
cross-platform and easily integrated with Docker technology,
which are critical features for our testbed. However, there
are also limitations including the maximum body size of a
request, which amounts to 30MB, resulting in a corresponding
limit to the files uploaded. However, it was considered that
this limitation does not render the tests performed ineffective,
as the incidence of encryption is more evident on small
files. Furthermore, the impact of bigger files to storage was
considered out of the scope of this article, as the current IPFS-
based implementation serves as a feature-complete example
rather than a high performant solution. In the majority of use
cases, such storage is replaced with on-cloud or on-premises
solutions, often already available to users.
VI. CONCLUSION
Special-purpose BCs from healthcare to industrial IoT, have
been recently introduced in the public domain. These solutions
have been portrayed as a valid alternative to centralised
architectures for trusted nodes. BC have the ability to process
more transactions and perform decentralised data sharing and
processing within and across the supply-chain. Their ability
to simplify business cross-border communications and data
movement and management in a large scale provides more
effective business collaboration and enhance security. In this
work, we proposed Cydon, a data management platform that
employs a novel crypto-token generation engine and search
mechanism which runs over a private permissioned BC. Cydon
delivers an always-on audit trail of data flows, while securely
distributes and retrieves data from different business entities
within a private distributed network.
To the best of our knowledge, Cydon, is the first real-
world implementation of a PoC to demonstrate the potentials
to leverage BC capabilities to search, locate and retrieve
encrypted and distributed data whilst producing a detailed and
immutable audit trail for reporting purposes. Part of our future
work includes further performance testing and refinements of
our algorithm and its associated distributed applications for
different BC technologies and consensus mechanisms. We also
seek to store Cydon token permissions directly in the BC
network instead of the server database. In this way we will
also be able to audit changes in our cydon’s token attributes
for users that their authorisation levels have changed over time.
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